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8 The fertility treatment time 
forgot: What should be done about 
surrogacy in the UK?
Kirsty Horsey and Katia Neofytou
Introduction
When the UK’s Department of Health announced a wholesale review of the 
UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (hereafter ‘the 1990 Act’), 
with the aim of making it ‘it for purpose’ in the twenty-irst century (Department 
of Health, 2005), this was welcomed by many scholars, practitioners and others 
who assumed – wrongly for the most part – that such a review and ‘updating’ of 
the legislation would include matters relating to surrogacy. Prior to the announce-
ment there had been academic and other criticism of the way that the law on 
surrogacy operated in the UK, particularly given that it had become, by the 
twenty-irst century if not before, a practice relatively culturally embedded and 
socially accepted (Horsey and Sheldon, 2012). However, when the time came, the 
public consultation document leading to the passage of the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008 (‘the 2008 Act’) asked only about extending the way 
legal parenthood is acquired following a surrogacy arrangement to those who 
were in civil partnerships or enduring relationships, mirroring legal changes else-
where that it would seem could never have been ignored, whatever the outcome 
of the consultation.1 The consultation did not question any of the assumptions on 
which the current law on surrogacy rests, such as by asking whether it is desirable 
to continue to discourage the practice by prohibiting any commercialisation of 
surrogacy and the payment of surrogates, or whether  surrogacy arrangements 
should continue to be unenforceable. Nor did it ask whether assumptions about 
parenthood – and motherhood in particular – following surrogacy were correct, 
even where those who commission a surrogate may both be the resulting child’s 
genetic (as well as intended) parents (Horsey, 2010).
This chapter considers the regulatory approach to surrogacy in the UK and 
some of the pitfalls of this model in the modern day. It starts by briely looking at 
how we got to where we are, and why. It then looks at what we label ‘21st Century 
surrogacy problems’ which stem not only from an increasing globalisation brought 
 1 Prior to the public consultation, a report from the House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee (2004) had said that the regulation of surrogacy should be reviewed, including the 
possibility of new, separate, surrogacy legislation.
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about by developments in technology and communication, but also from the 
UK’s own inertia with respect to surrogacy regulation, which remains ‘hazy’ after 
30 years (Horsey and Sheldon, 2012) and ‘thoroughly confused’ (Warnock, 2002). 
The building momentum in support of surrogacy law reform from academic com-
mentators, practitioners, the judiciary and some parliamentarians is then noted, 
giving weight to the impression that something ought to have been done about 
surrogacy in 2008. In the inal section, we look at potential models of regulation 
from other jurisdictions – notably Greece and Israel – that the UK might consider 
when deciding how to reform surrogacy law, before concluding with some recom-
mendations for the future.
Surrogacy in the UK 
Though it had a rocky past, with its emergence into the public consciousness 
around the early 1980s, the public image of surrogacy underwent much trans-
formation through the latter years of the last century. Early judicial comments in 
surrogacy cases were acerbic, relecting an antipathy towards the practice and a 
sense that surrogacy agreements were contrary to public policy.2 The Warnock 
Committee, in 1984, decried surrogacy as objectionable, a ‘risky undertaking’ 
that distorts the mother–child relationship and ‘the wrong way to approach preg-
nancy’ (Warnock Committee Report, 1984; chapter 8). The Committee ultimately 
recommended that the use of surrogacy as a treatment for infertility should be 
actively discouraged and that commercial activities relating to surrogacy be crimi-
nalised.3 Warnock’s recommendations resulted in the Surrogacy Arrangements 
Act 1985 (hereafter ‘the 1985 Act’), which remains in force today. The 1985 Act, 
which had dual goals of protecting vulnerable women and discouraging surrogacy 
(Jackson, 2001; 262), makes it a criminal ofence to advertise for or as a surrogate 
or to facilitate surrogacy on a commercial basis.
Later legislative provisions afecting surrogacy were put in place with the 1990 
Act. Section 36 of the 1990 Act inserted section 1A into the 1985 Act, render-
ing all surrogacy agreements wholly unenforceable (something that the Warnock 
Committee had originally recommended). Sections 27 and 28 of the 1990 Act 
designated the legal parents of children born following the use of assisted repro-
ductive technologies (ART) which, when it was undertaken in a clinical context 
using IVF procedures and/or donated gametes, would also encompass surrogacy. 
Section 30 of the 1990 Act established the Parental Order, a legal mechanism 
whereby a court could transfer legal parenthood of a surrogate-born child to the 
commissioning parents when certain conditions are met.
In 1998, a further review of surrogacy in the UK was commissioned by the 
 2 In particular see A v C (1978) 8 Fam Law 170; [1985] FLR 445, though contrast Latey J in Re C 
(a minor) [1985] FLR 846.
 3 Though notably the published report included an annex containing a dissenting opinion written 
by three of the Committee. In later years, Baroness Warnock changed her views on surrogacy, 
coming ‘to think that probably [the] minority was right’ (Warnock, 2002).
HORSEY 9781138021891 PRINT.indd   118 16/03/2015   10:14
The fertility treatment time forgot 119
government, largely to look into the money aspect of surrogacy arrangements. It 
had by that time become apparent that some surrogates could receive quite large 
sums of money for their services, notionally at least in the form of expenses. The 
new Committee, chaired by Professor Margaret Brazier, thus focused mainly 
on the issue of payments to surrogates and the way in which the law should be 
reformed in order that it ‘continued to meet public concerns’ (Brazier Committee 
Report, 1998: [1.1]), including via making changes to the provisions of the 1985 
and 1990 Acts.4 The Brazier Committee recommended that payments to surro-
gates should be prohibited, with the exception of reimbursement of ‘genuine and 
veriiable’ expenses incurred by the surrogate as a direct result of the pregnancy 
(Brazier Committee Report, 1998: [5.25]), which should be deined in legislation. 
Arguably the Committee’s more important recommendation was that the 1985 
Act and Section 30 of the 1990 Act should be repealed and a new Surrogacy 
Act created in their place. This new Act should continue to render surrogacy 
agreements unenforceable and maintain the prohibitions on commercial sur-
rogacy, and would require the establishment of a statutory Code of Practice for 
non-proit surrogacy agencies that would be registered with the Department of 
Health. The Code would be binding on all agencies and any party entering a 
surrogacy arrangement (Brazier Committee Report, 1998 [7.18]-[7.19]). The 
Brazier Committee also envisaged that a revised Parental Order scheme would 
continue to operate, adding the condition that commissioning couples would only 
be eligible for a Parental Order if they had complied with all the provisions of the 
new Surrogacy Act. The Committee’s concerns regarding payments to surrogates 
meant it also recommended that payments (other than those reimbursing ‘genuine 
and veriiable’ expenses) would not in future be able to be retrospectively author-
ised by a court (Brazier Committee Report, 1998 [7.22]). 
However, nothing came of the Brazier Committee’s recommendations and 
no new Surrogacy Act was passed. The practice of surrogacy continued as it had 
done before and very little was heard of it in the courts for some time. For a while 
at least, surrogacy was of the radar: it was the fertility treatment that time forgot.
As indicated above, the limited treatment of surrogacy in the public consulta-
tion leading to the HFE Act 2008 meant that little changed in the way surrogacy 
is regulated, despite the Science and Technology Committee’s 2004 recommen-
dations. Empirical studies published a little before the Department of Health’s 
consultation document, which indicated that children and parents in families 
created through surrogacy fare well (Golombok et al, 2005),5 yet this also appears 
not to have made the need for better regulation more pressing. Instead, the 2008 
 4 By this time, the medical profession, as represented by the British Medical Association (BMA) 
had changed its mind about surrogacy. In 1984 it had recommended that its members did not 
get involved in surrogacy at all. In 1990, it had said that surrogacy would be ethical as a means 
of treating infertility in couples where other forms of treatment had failed. But in 1996, the BMA 
published guidance acknowledging surrogacy as an acceptable reproductive option ‘of last resort’ 
(British Medical Association, 1996).
 5 Follow-up longitudinal studies conducted when the children were older also support this: see e.g. 
Golombok et al (2011); Jadva et al (2012).  
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Act merely extended the ability to apply for a Parental Order to same-sex couples 
and those in an enduring family relationship,6 rather than just married couples; 
none of the other Parental Order requirements changed. While this is welcome, 
it hardly marks wholesale reconsideration of parenthood following surrogacy 
(Horsey, 2010) and indeed has been criticised as simply maintaining or replicating 
the ‘spirit’ of the 1990 provisions (McCandless and Sheldon, 2010). The 2008 Act 
also exempted the operation of some not-for-proit surrogacy services from the 
criminal provisions of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 and allowing them 
to recoup inancial costs involved in the provision of their services,7 though it 
might be said that such piecemeal reform does not go far enough and that it would 
be better to have surrogacy agencies working on a proper, though regulated, com-
mercial basis, in the interests of all parties concerned. Rather than ‘tinkering with 
the existing legal provisions’ (Fox, 2009), serious consideration should be given 
to how surrogacy operates in reality this century and how best to facilitate those 
arrangements while extending the protections deemed necessary to safeguard the 
interests of the parties involved. This was clearly not achieved by the 2008 Act.8
More recently, we have seen a spate of surrogacy cases in the courts, the majority 
of which concern issues arising from cross-border surrogacy arrangements, which 
have become increasingly common in an era of easy-access online information and 
easy travel. In addition, impetus stirred by some of these cases has led to advance-
ments being made in relation to the way some aspects of surrogacy are dealt with 
domestically, including the introduction of maternity leave rights in 2015 for those 
who achieve parenthood through surrogacy, in recognition that commissioning 
parents perform the actual role of parent from birth.9 At the time of writing 
there is impetus in parliament, supported by practitioners and interest groups, 
among others, towards re-regulation. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) has also started to update the information it provides about sur-
rogacy, but there remains a long way to go to make the law it for the twenty-irst 
century, which has seen a whole new set of problems emerge and likely to continue. 
Twenty-first-century surrogacy problems
The biggest problem currently arising from surrogacy is that many people are 
travelling to other countries to engage women there as surrogates. There are a 
 6 Parental Order provisions now contained in section 54.
 7 Section 59 inserts S2A into the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.
 8 As was acknowledged by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, which reviewed the changes 
proposed in the draft legislation: it said the changes were not enough ‘to protect both children 
born as a result of surrogacy and surrogate mothers’ (House of Lords, House of Commons Joint 
Committee (2007), at [289]).
 9 See RKA v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2012?]. The Children and Families Act 
2014 allows parents through surrogacy and eligible/intending to apply for a Parental Order the 
same rights to time of work to care for their new children as those adopting children, broadly in 
line with that for other parents. Regulations in 2015 will provide the framework in which applica-
tions can be made.  It represents the irst legal recognition that intended parents are responsible 
for their children from birth.
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handful of other nations where engaging a surrogate, even across language bar-
riers, is made easy for those from the UK, as well as from other countries from 
which people might travel. There are many reasons why putative parents might 
travel for surrogacy. It is often easier (particularly when information about the ser-
vices ofered can be accessed via the internet – see Jackson, this volume), cheaper 
(in the long run) and quicker than trying to ind a surrogate at home. For some 
who travel for surrogacy (though not those from the UK), it is because surrogacy 
is prohibited at home. For others, restrictions placed on the legal operation of 
surrogacy in the home country might encourage commissioning couples to go 
elsewhere. This potentially includes some parents from the UK, where ‘clinical’ 
surrogacy using IVF procedures is heavily regulated in ways that might not suit 
everyone’s needs, all arrangements are precarious and unenforceable, and even 
private arrangements may potentially fall foul of any payments made to the surro-
gate (though seemingly not in practice, judging from the amount of retrospectively 
judicially authorised payments).10 Describing the cross-border surrogacy trend 
in 2013, one lawyer who has worked on many of the most recent international 
surrogacy cases to come before the UK courts, said ‘it always amazes me quite 
the lengths people will go to, and how impossible it is to stop this happening’ 
(Prosser, 2013). It is not only the home nation’s rules or prohibitions that encour-
age cross-border surrogacy. In many of the destinations where those travelling for 
surrogacy tend to go, the practice of surrogacy is as yet, unregulated. In others, it 
is commercialised to the extent that those accessing surrogacy there are more like 
consumers. Some, such as the US (notably California and Illinois), India, Ukraine, 
Georgia and Thailand have become well-known as ‘open’ surrogacy destina-
tions11. Others are emerging, including Russia, Mexico and Canada (on the latter, 
see White, this volume). Though each country has its own laws (which obviously 
vary state by state in the US) relating directly and/or indirectly to surrogacy, each 
allows surrogates to receive payments (making surrogates easier to ind) and often 
there are commercial agencies or similar willing to match prospective parents with 
surrogates for a fee. 
Whatever the reason for travelling, it would appear that cross-border surrogacy 
(in the same way as for many other medical and other services) is here to stay, par-
ticularly if no change is made to our domestic law. However, crossing borders to 
access easier, cheaper and faster surrogacy brings with it its own set of problems, 
10 See as far back as Re Q (Parental Order) [1996] 1 FLR 369, then more recently Re x and Y (Foreign 
Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030; Re L (a minor) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam) and others. It should 
be noted that the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010 
conirmed that in granting orders a child’s welfare must be paramount. As Hedley J pointed out in 
Re X and Y, ‘it is almost impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in which by the time the case 
comes to court, the welfare of the child… would not be gravely compromised at the very least) by 
a refusal to make an order’ (at [24]).
11 Note, however, that the situation in Thailand seems likely to change following a recent parlia-
mentary vote in favour of banning commercial surrogacy, in the wake of the ‘Baby Gammy’ saga 
and other controversies. A inal version of the proposed new law should be debated in early 2015 
(Ahmad and Brooks, 2015; Sharpe, 2014).
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as has been illustrated in case law here and abroad, alongside media representa-
tions of how surrogacy is conducted in other countries and in particular in cases 
where things go badly wrong.12 While we do not and cannot know exactly how 
many people travel abroad from the UK to access surrogacy (Natalie Gamble 
Associates, 2014), we have indications that the use of surrogacy in general is 
increasing, for example because of the number of applications for Parental Orders 
being made (Crawshaw et al, 2012). Correspondingly, there have been more cases 
being brought before the courts, including a signiicant number of cases where 
the surrogacy has taken place overseas, as well as more anecdotal evidence about 
the number of people seeking legal advice on this (Prosser, 2013) and numer-
ous reports in the media. The irst of a lurry of international or cross-border 
surrogacy cases in the UK were decided in 2007–8.13 These – and subsequent 
cases – illustrate some of the many legal problems that cross-border surrogacy can 
generate, not only for potential parents, but also for the children born to surro-
gates overseas. This is not to mention the additional practical, personal (including 
inancial) and social problems that might be faced.14 
Further, hidden in the subtext of any discussion of cross-border surrogacy are 
some unpalatable issues and di cult questions. Inevitably there is concern about 
which women volunteer to be surrogates in countries where payment is allowed, 
and indeed whether they can truly be said to have volunteered at all. Does 
paying women reduce them to vessels and/or amount to the commodiication of 
pregnancy, childbirth and even children? Or, might being paid for surrogacy in 
some way liberate women, allowing them inancial independence or gains they 
might otherwise not have been able to achieve? And, notwithstanding how we feel 
about paying the women themselves, how can we justify allowing agencies and 
other intermediaries to trade in the misery of infertility by sourcing women to be 
surrogates?
For these reasons and more, it becomes imperative that we closely examine 
our surrogacy laws. We argue that the careful drafting of more facilitative regula-
tion in the UK, which better recognises the realities of modern day surrogacy, 
including its internationalisation and the fact that payments are made,15 would 
beneit commissioning parents, surrogates and children alike. Further, it should – 
if done well – put an end to judicial tinkering which, though welcome in those 
cases where it has occurred, serves only to indicate the law is not currently as it 
12 Perhaps most recently illustrated by the ‘Baby Gammy’ situation, where one of a pair of twins born 
to a surrogate in Thailand was rejected by the commissioning couple for having Down syndrome 
and left in the hands of the surrogate (Callaghan and Newson, 2014) – as well as subsequent stories 
in the media piggy-backing on this unfortunate case.
13 Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) [2007] EWHC 2814; Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 
3030.
14 Such as those illustrated by lawyers/MPs in the debate, etc. with regards being stuck overseas, 
waiting, etc.
15 Note that similar concerns have been raised elsewhere: see e.g. van Zyl and Walker (2013); 
Millbank (2014) and Stuhmcke, this volume.
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should be (Rozenberg, 2014).16 Recent indings indicate that the regulation of 
surrogacy varies signiicantly not only around the world but also within Europe 
(McCandless et al., 2013). The analysis below ofers an insight into two regulatory 
regimes – those of Greece and Israel – regarding the practice of surrogacy. These 
two models provide a basis for fruitful comparison for two reasons: irst, in both 
countries surrogacy is condoned by comprehensive legislation; secondly, in both 
countries surrogacy contracts are legal and enforceable.
The Greek regulatory model on surrogacy
Greece is one the only European country that adopts (since 2002) a novel approach 
allowing for altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements based on enforceable 
surrogacy contracts that are reviewed and authorised by the national courts prior 
to conception, and which potentially lead to automatic transfer of legal parent-
hood after the birth of the child. Though the Greek regulatory model for sur-
rogacy has provided a complete response to issues concerning the relationship of 
the parties to a surrogacy arrangement, issues of payments, and legal parentage 
of the surrogate-born child, its legal stipulations have been poorly explored by 
the international literature. Moreover, a considerable lack of sociological data is 
available thus far, which makes it di cult to evaluate the efectiveness of the law 
in Greek society.
Greece is one of the few countries that oicially recognises a constitutional 
right to procreate and parent a child (grounded on the individual freedom of 
expression),17 even through the use of ARTs. Greek society can generally be 
described as placing great importance on the institution of the family, and repro-
duction within the family – whether natural or assisted – is endorsed by the 
Christian Orthodox tradition, the most popular religion in the country18. Low 
birth rates, together with high rates of infertility afecting almost 15 per cent of 
the adult population (Ravdas, 2010) and low IVF success rates, led the Greek 
legislature to suggest surrogacy as an alternative way of reproduction. Fearing 
16 See e.g. Re D and L (2012), where the consent of the surrogate was waived, as she could not be 
found and, most recently, Re X (a child) (surrogacy: time limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam) in which Sir 
Justice Mumby, President of the Family Division, criticised the rigidity of the rules governing the 
Parental Orders, in particular the requirement that applications for an order must be made within 
six months of a child’s birth, and allowed a late application to be made. In a blog post commenting 
on the case, Natalie Gamble Associates (2014), say that it ‘demonstrates yet again, just how out of 
date the UK’s surrogacy laws are’ and describes the law as ‘creaking under the strain’ of modern 
surrogacy practice.
17 Article 5(1), Greek Constitution. See also Trokanas, T. (2011) ‘Human Reproduction – Personal 
autonomy and its limits’ (in Greek), Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki, Greece: 91; 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki, E., (2005) ‘Assisted reproduction and Family Law. The Greek regime: 
Laws 3089/2002 and 3305/2005’ (in Greek), Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Thessaloniki, 
Greece: 8.
18 The Church is against donor IVF, and having children outside the marriage. Where married 
heterosexual couples sufer from infertility, the Church suggests adoption. However, it has not 
expressed any opinion against surrogacy per se’.
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concerns relating to exploitation and commodiication, and in order to protect 
the interests of the parties to a surrogacy arrangement (most importantly, of the 
surrogate-born child), in 2002 the Law 3089/2002 on Medically Assisted Human 
Reproduction was passed by the Greek Parliament, which facilitates surrogacy. In 
2005, law 3305/2005 was passed to establish an express prohibition on payments 
for surrogacy (article 13(4)), and to impose criminal sanctions (article 26).19
The speciic provisions of the Law are incorporated into the Greek Civil Code 
(hereafter GCC), and more precisely into article 1458 GCC, which introduces an 
exception to the presumption of maternity grounded on gestation and birth (article 
1463 GCC). Thus, a woman who has been granted a pre-conception court order 
approving the agreement between her and another woman (the gestational carrier) 
can be presumed to be the legal mother of the surrogate-born child immediately 
after birth. Her parental right is based on her intention to have and raise the child.
Under Greek law, surrogacy is available to single or married women, or women 
in de facto relationships, who have been medically diagnosed as unable to conceive, 
or bring a pregnancy to term, or to women who might transmit a dangerous 
hereditary condition to the child (such as sickle cell anaemia, or HIV/AIDS, 
among others). Although article 1458 refers to women, for reasons of gender 
equality (guaranteed by article 4(1) of the Constitution), surrogacy might also be 
an option for single men.20 However, it is not, currently, for same-sex couples.
The intended mother must seek approval from the national court before the 
fertilisation of the surrogate takes place. She must submit the written surrogacy 
agreement, and aidavit from a doctor airming her inability to carry or give 
birth to a child, as well as the good physical health of the potential surrogate, 
psychiatric assessments conirming the good emotional state of both women, as 
well as consent forms signed by the two women’s co-habitants or husbands, if 
they have one. The latter is required because in Greece paternity is determined 
based on the man’s relationship with the legal mother of the child (1463 GCC). 
Consequently, the partner or husband of the legal mother of the child, will be 
presumed to be her legal father.21
19 The criminal sanctions refer to the intended mother and the surrogate carrier, as well as the medi-
cal staf, and any paid intermediaries who will assist the performance of surrogacy against the legal 
provisions. Moreover, advertising for surrogacy is illegal. The penalty is the payment of a ine up 
to 1,500 euros and at least 2 years of imprisonment. However, there has been no case where sanc-
tions have been imposed by the Greek courts. The importance of the ‘best interests of the child’ 
arguably makes it very unlikely for any surrogacy contract not to be approved, even in retrospect, 
or for any actions to be considered as willingly circumventing the law.
20 The Greek court authorised surrogacy for a single man in 2008 and 2009 (One-Member Court of 
First Instance of Thessaloniki decision no. 2827/2008 and 13707/2009). Nevertheless, the Appeal 
Court in 2010 overturned the decision deeming the irst decisions illegal, since the letter of the law 
clearly refers to a woman. Since the judges in Greece are not bound by legal precedent, they are 
free to make broad interpretations of the law, and approve a future application of a single man to 
surrogacy based on his constitutional right to procreate and the principle of gender equality. See 
also Kounougeri-Manoledaki, E., (2010): 2–3 (in Greek). The single man should prove his infertil-
ity and the need for surrogacy, as a woman would have to.
21 This presumption is rebuttable.
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Furthermore, until 2014, the intended mother’s application had to prove 
that both she and the surrogate-to-be were domiciled in Greece (article 8, 
Law 3089/2002). This requirement was supposedly included to  eliminate the 
 possibility of ‘ reproductive tourism’ and international surrogacy  arrangements, 
which  may render the child parentless and stateless. However, in July 
2014 the Greek Parliament passed a new amendment to the law  allowing 
for   non- permanent  residents to come to Greece, get treatment for surrogacy 
and be recognised as the legal parents of the child under the Greek law. More 
 speciically,  article 17 of Law 4272/2014 provides that either the surrogate or the 
intended mother in a  surrogacy arrangement should at minimum be temporary 
residents in Greece, which then leaves open the possibility for foreign couples 
to seek  surrogacy in Greece. This amendment could obviously place Greece 
as yet another popular destination to those willing to travel for international 
surrogacy.22
Importantly, the law states that the egg to be fertilised for the purposes of 
 surrogacy should not belong to the surrogate. Only gestational surrogacy is 
allowed in Greece, and, therefore, the egg must either come from the intended 
mother, or a donor, meaning that in all cases the resulting child has no direct 
genetic relation to the surrogate. As for the sperm, it can either come from the 
 commissioning father, if there is one, or a donor. Accordingly, the Greek law 
accepts the case of full social parenting, since the surrogate-born child can poten-
tially be  genetically unrelated to her parent(s). Moreover, it becomes apparent 
that the only way to achieve a surrogate pregnancy is through IVF, which must 
be performed by  specialised medical personnel in a hospital or fertility clinic 
licensed by the National Authority for Medically Assisted Reproduction (hereafter 
NAMAR).23
The intended mother must also prove that the surrogacy arrangement is altru-
istic, and that no payment will be made to the surrogate during pregnancy or 
after childbirth, except for ‘reasonable expenses’. Article 13(4) of Law 3305/2005 
22 Stéphane Kovacs, ‘La Grece, L’Eldorado de la GPA’ Le Figaro (3/10/2014) (in French) <http://www.
leigaro.fr/mon-igaro/2014/10/03/10001-20141003ARTFIG00288-en-grece-l- eldorado-de-la-
gpa.php> .See also Gènéthique, ‘Greece. The New Eldorado for infertile couples’ (11/08/2014) 
<http://www.genethique.org/en/greece-new-eldorado-infertile-couples-61946.html>.
23 NAMAR started operating in 2005, but ceased functioning in 2010. Former members of NAMAR 
reported that it was never able to fully operate, due to the State’s continuous refusal and/or 
tardiness in approving its decisions, as well as the lack of state funding (Kaiafa-Gbandi et al 
(2012): 181, 183). The new law has re-established the Greek NAMAR (the equivalent of the 
HFE Authority) and it re-started its operations mid-October 2014. All Greek fertility clinics 
(67 in total) have in the interim been working without the necessary licence from and control 
of NAMAR. According to recent press announcements by the newly appointed President of 
NAMAR, the Authority will irst and foremost focus on documenting and performing stringent 
controls on all the Greek fertility centres (Karlatira, P., ‘Without license the 67 fertility clinics in 
Greece’ (in Greek), Newspaper Proto Thema (15/10/2014) <http://www.protothema.gr/ugeia/
article/418527/horis-adeia-oi-67-monades-upovoithoumenis- anaparagogis-sti-hora-mas/>. 
See also Vasiliki Aggouridi, ‘NAMAR has been “resurrected”’ (16/10/2014) <http://www.
virus.com.gr/site/index.php/health/health-and-pharma-news-reports/item/4164-anastithike- 
i-ethniki-arxi-iatrikos-ypovoithoymenis-anaparagogi%E2%80%A6>.
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further stipulates what these might include: expenses relating to the accomplish-
ment of pregnancy through the use of ARTs, namely the costs of IVF treat-
ment; the costs of pregnancy clothing, drugs and any other medical treatment the 
pregnant woman might need; the costs for childbirth and post-natal care of the 
surrogate and the child; as well as any wage loss that the surrogate might incur 
during pregnancy and immediately after birth. NAMAR had in 2008 suggested 
a set payment of 10,000 euros,24 but empirical evidence shows that the amount 
paid might reach 12,000 euros, or even more, since the law has introduced no 
mechanism for state monitoring of potential ‘under the table’ payments (Hatzis, 
2009, 2010; Ravdas, 2010).
The judge, after reviewing all the aforementioned documentation and 
evidence,25 and guided by the ‘best interests’ of the child principle, may approve 
the surrogacy agreement and authorise the fertilisation of the surrogate. Any 
clauses that seem to unjustiiably limit the surrogate’s freedom during pregnancy 
are deemed invalid and illegal (179 GCC). In this light, any restrictions to the 
surrogate’s lifestyle, or any duty to conform with a certain lifestyle, or any pro-
hibition on her right to a lawful abortion,26 or a non-consensual obligation for 
the surrogate to undergo invasive medical procedures during pregnancy, such 
as amniocentesis, are illegal and invalid. Immediately after the birth of the child, 
the surrogacy contract becomes legal and enforceable. The intended mother is 
presumed to be the legal mother of the child. This presumption can, however, be 
rebutted if the surrogate, within six months after the birth of the child, presents to 
the court suicient proof that the child is in fact genetically related to her and her 
partner/husband (article 1464(2) GCC).
The court-authorised surrogacy arrangement can be described as a contract 
for the provision of services, operating as a mandate to the surrogate to relinquish 
the child to the intended mother. In case the surrogate then fails to hand the 
child over to the intended – and now legal – mother, the latter can apply to the 
court and force her to adhere to the terms of the agreement (article 946, Code of 
Civil Procedure). The legal mother is also entitled to compensation for breach of 
contract.27 On the other hand, though this is highly unlikely, the intended mother 
has no right to refuse to take the child up. In twelve years that the law has been 
in place, however, no application to resolve parenthood following surrogacy has 
reached the national courts.
24 NAMAR decision, no. 36/2008 – Oicial Government Gazette 670/B’/16.04.2008.
25 The judge has little discretional power; he/she is required to only review the validity of the agree-
ment and determine whether the legal conditions have been met, without investigating the reasons 
for choosing this method. Consequently, the court approval can be depicted as more of a formal 
bureaucratic procedure requirement, a ‘rubber stamp’, rather than a process for full judicial 
review of surrogacy arrangements.
26 Article 304, Greek Criminal Code (GCrimC). However, the surrogate that has aborted the foetus 
has to return any money that the intended mother might have given her up to that point, and 
might also be liable for compensation to the intended mother due to breach of contract.
27 If the surrogate runs away with the child, she will be held criminally liable for the criminal ofence 
of child abduction (article 324 GCrimC).
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Within ten days of her birth, the child must be registered in the national registry 
under the name of the intended/legal mother, and the name of her partner or 
husband, if he had consented to the procedure. Law 344/1976 governing the 
National Birth Registry does not introduce any special requirements regarding 
the registration of surrogate-born children. The legal mother must submit a copy 
of the court decision that had authorised the surrogacy procedure to the registrar 
(article 20, Law 3089/2002).28 No other legal process, such as adoption or an 
application for parental order, needs to be followed.
Greek Law thus ofers a novel approach to surrogacy. It provides for a mecha-
nism that is relatively simple and fast. The law allows for altruistic gestational 
surrogacy and is available to infertile single women (and possibly single men), 
married women, or women co-habiting with a (male) partner. In its current state, 
surrogacy is not an option for same-sex couples, but many scholars have stressed 
the need for a relevant legal reform. State interference in the process is limited 
to a court authorisation of the surrogacy agreement before the fertilisation of the 
surrogate. The Law includes requirements for the good physical and emotional 
state of the surrogate carrier, and declares the paramountcy of the ‘best interests’ 
of the child. It also allows for an automatic transfer, or better yet, a presumption 
of maternity in favour of the intended mother based on a contract that is enforce-
able, and functions as a ‘safety net’ for the interests of the parties to the agree-
ment, as well as the interests of the child. Finally, the Greek model protects the 
surrogate’s autonomy rights during pregnancy, and endorses a modern approach 
to family, one based purely on intention, rather than biology, since the surrogate-
born child might not be genetically related to either of her parents. Two potential 
disadvantages could be said to exist: irst, there is no mechanism to ensure that 
the relationship between the parties is indeed altruistic (Hatzis, 2009, 2010; Stoll, 
2013); and second, there is no possibility to re-evaluate the arrangement, if the 
situation changes after it has been authorised by the court (Stoll, 2013: 318). 
However, in considering the Greek model as a way of guiding reform in the UK, 
these issues could be considered.
The Israeli regulatory model on surrogacy
Israel can be described as ‘a pronatalist society whose Jewish Israeli population 
will try anything in order to have a child’ (Schenker, 2003: 251; Teman, 2003a: 
261–2). Israeli policy seems to actively foster and promote a duty for Israeli Jews 
to reproduce, including through the use of ARTs, which are both legal and 
state-funded (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2007; Kahn, 2000; Shalev, 1998; Stoll, 2013; 
Teman, 2003b). The pronatalistic ideology is deeply rooted in various religious, 
historical and political factors, including the centrality of the biblical directive ‘to 
be fruitful and multiply’ (Sperling, 2010); the power of Judaic authorities on soci-
ety and the law (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2007: 24); the Holocaust and immigration 
28 There is no requirement for the surrogate’s name to be included in the registry. The identity of any 
gamete donors remains undisclosed (article 1460 GCC).
HORSEY 9781138021891 PRINT.indd   127 16/03/2015   10:14
128 Human fertilisation and embryology
trauma; the emotional needs of a society that is in a constant war-state (Teman, 
2003b: 80); and demography politics. It is, therefore, not surprising that surrogacy 
in Israel is legally condoned and its practice is facilitated, although with careful 
state monitoring.
In 1996, the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) passed a comprehensive law entirely 
devoted to surrogacy, the Surrogate Motherhood Agreements Act (hereafter ‘the 
SMA Act’). Israel became the irst country in the world to allow pre-conception 
surrogacy arrangements that, if approved by the Government-appointed approv-
als committee, are legal and enforceable and can lead to an after-the-birth transfer 
of parentage to the commissioning couple. The SMA Act is designed to protect 
the interests of the parties to such an arrangement, and the child, doing so from 
a religious standpoint, and, more speciically, from a Jewish standpoint (Dorner, 
2000: 194). The Act is divided into two parts: one concerning the approval of the 
agreement and the second regarding the determination of parentage.
The SMA Act introduces a mechanism of intense state control throughout 
the surrogacy process (Benshushan and Schenker, 1997). The most important 
features of the law are: a public committee authorises and monitors each case; 
surrogacy, at this point, is only available to married heterosexual couples;29 only 
full surrogacy, where at least the sperm of the commissioning father is used, is per-
mitted; the agreement is altruistic, and only reasonable expenses approved by the 
committee can be paid to the surrogate; the surrogate must be single or divorced, 
of the same religion as the commissioning couple, and not a relative of one of the 
commissioning parents; both the surrogate and the commissioning couple must 
be domiciled in Israel; the surrogate retains a very limited right to withdraw from 
the agreement; after the birth of the child the contract becomes enforceable; the 
transfer of parentage to the commissioning couple is subject to the issuance of an 
after-birth parentage order. Between the time immediately after the birth and the 
issuance of the order, the child is in the custody of the commissioning couple, but 
a social worker holds legal guardianship of the child.
The Approvals Committee is appointed by the Health Minister and comprises 
of seven members, including medical professionals, one lay member, a social 
worker and a clergyman (SMA Act Ch 2. S.3(a)(1)-(7)). The role of the Committee 
is to review all applications for surrogacy, check whether all statutory require-
ments relating to the surrogate or the commissioning parents have been met, and 
that all necessary documents have been submitted and, if so, approve agreements. 
29 Under the current law, single men and women and same-sex couples cannot have a child through 
surrogacy in Israel, and have to travel abroad. Popular destinations for Israeli gay couples seeking 
surrogacy are India and Thailand. If they successfully have a child through a surrogate abroad, 
they then must face the Israeli government’s reluctance to legally recognise their children as Israeli 
citizens, resulting in many legal hurdles concerning the return of the child to Israel and her reg-
istration in the country’s birth registers (María Victoria Rivas Llanos, 2013). The Knesset is now 
considering the passing of a Surrogacy Bill for singles and same-sex couples (Harkov, 2014). The 
decision could not have been timelier, since Indian authorities have announced that surrogacy 
will only be available to heterosexual couples that have been married for at least two years (Vyas, 
2014).
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In deciding whether to approve a certain agreement, the Committee takes into 
consideration the future child’s welfare (Ch. 2 S.5(2)-(3)). If the couple proceeds to 
the fertilisation of the surrogate without the Committee’s approval, penalties of up 
to one year in prison can be incurred (Ch. 3 S.19(a)-(b)).
The requirement that the surrogate must either be single or divorced (Ch. 2 
S.2(3)(a)) is for the prevention of potential adultery. As Shalev (1998: 65) explains, 
this requirement is based on the religious legal (halakhic) principle that a child 
born within marriage that is not genetically related to the woman’s husband is a 
mamzer (a bastard). A mamzer will have to face the consequence to later be only able 
to marry a mamzerim or convert. However, the Act provides an exception to the 
requirement of the surrogate being unmarried. If the commissioning couple has 
made reasonable eforts to ind an unmarried potential surrogate, but has failed, 
the Committee might still approve their agreement (Ch. 2 S.2(3)(a)). Moreover, 
the surrogate must not be related to either of the intended parents (Ch. 2 S.2(3)
(b)). The reason for this is the prevention of coercion potentially exerted on a 
female relative to act as a surrogate (Schenker, 2003). Surprisingly, though, adop-
tive relatives are permitted to act as surrogates and, thus, there exists the danger 
that they might be emotionally pressured to accept to enter into the agreement in 
an efort to ‘‘repay’ for the beneit of being adopted (Frenkel, 2001: 611).
Another important requirement of the Act is that the surrogate must be of 
the same religion as the commissioning mother. This is because Jewishness is 
determined matrilineally (Shalev, 1998) and, hence, a Jewish child must have 
been gestated by a Jewish woman. This is, again, based on halakhic rational, as is 
the requirement for the sperm of the commissioning father to be used for the sur-
rogate conception (Ch. 2 S.2(4)). According to Shalev, Israeli family law provides 
that ‘[p]aternity is established at conception’ (1998: 68), and, therefore, the child 
must be genetically related to her father. Shalev contends that this also ‘stems...
from halakhic considerations as to the certainty of paternity…[b]ut at the same 
time it poses the genetic continuity of the man at the centre of attention’ (1998: 
92). Based on the mamzerut rule, the commissioning couple is prohibited from 
using the surrogate’s ova for the fertilisation. As becomes apparent, the Israeli 
surrogacy-conception is a fully medicalised procedure necessarily involving IVF, 
as is the case in Greece.
Another similar feature of the Israeli law is that, together with the surrogacy 
agreement, the intended couple must submit medical reports proving the inability 
of the intended mother to achieve pregnancy or bring it to term, and the suitabil-
ity of the potential surrogate. They must also submit the results of psychological 
assessments of the parties. The diference in Israel is that the intended parents 
must additionally provide a statement that they have received professional coun-
selling, in which they explored other alternatives to parenthood.
If all requirements have been met, the Approvals Committee will authorise the 
agreement. It then continues to supervise the surrogacy procedure by reviewing 
and approving the payment of ‘reasonable expenses’ including ‘medical costs, 
costs for insurance, legal consultation, loss of time and income, sufering or any 
other reasonable expenses’. Such a broad approach to the content of ‘reasonable 
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expenses’ raises concerns about the pure altruistic character of the arrangement 
that seems to more closely resemble a commercial arrangement. Nevertheless, 
any payments must be scrutinised and approved. Payments to intermediaries are, 
however, legal: the amount to be paid is left to the discretion of the commissioning 
couple and the surrogacy broker.
The most important similarity between the Israeli and the Greek model is that 
pre-approved surrogacy arrangements are legal and enforceable. The surrogate 
has an express statutory right to have an abortion (Ch 4 S.18), if she wishes to, 
but, if she decides to continue with the pregnancy and childbirth, she must then 
relinquish the newborn to the commissioning parents. This takes place in the 
presence of a social worker, who must be notiied of the event of the delivery 
within twenty-four hours. From then onwards, the child will be in the custody of 
the commissioning couple, who must apply within seven days after the delivery 
to the court for a parentage order so they may be acknowledged as the child’s 
legal parents. Until the granting of the order by the court, legal guardianship 
belongs to the social worker, and the parties retain their right to change their 
minds and withdraw from the agreement (Ch 3 ss.13–14). They will, however, 
have to convince the court of a change in circumstances that justiies that, and 
the welfare oicer must agree that this is in the child’s interests (Ch 3 S.11(b)). 
To this end, the surrogate has very limited chances to renege on the agreement 
and keep the child. After the parentage order has been made, the Act does not 
permit withdrawal from the surrogacy agreement. The surrogate-born child’s 
birth must, however, be entered into a special register (Ch 3 S.16(b)). As Shalev 
notes, this creates ‘the danger of stigmatisation of the children’ born following 
surrogacy (1998: 90).
In conclusion, the Israeli surrogacy law is unique, not only because it provides 
such a complete response to surrogacy; its provisions are also in line with the par-
ticular cultural and halakhic traditions of Israel. It has facilitated freedom to enter 
surrogacy arrangements, albeit within state-deined limits and controls in every 
step of the process. These are thought to efectively protect the interests of both 
the parties to the arrangement and the child, and also ‘promote the state’s reli-
gious and pronatalistic agendas’ (Stoll, 2013). However, Israeli law does not make 
surrogacy available to same-sex couples, or single parents. This is now, though, 
under consideration by the Israeli Parliament, and it is to be hoped that important 
changes are forthcoming (see Cassidy, 2014; Oryszczuk, 2014).30
Conclusion
Prohibiting payments for surrogacy in the UK in the way the Brazier Committee 
recommended was always likely to be counter-productive in the sense that it 
30 Patricia Cassidy ‘Israel’s Cabinet approves surrogacy for same-sex couples and single people’, 
BioNews 757, 09/06/2014 (accessed 20/07/2014): http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_427299.
asp ; Stephen Oryszczuk, ‘Israel surrogacy for gay couples one step closer’, Jewish News Online, 
28/10/2014 (last accessed 3/11/2014).
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would drive more people to ‘underground’ and completely unregulated sur-
rogacy services (Freeman, 1999). These days, any restrictions on surrogacy, 
whether on access, payments or even to the acquisition of legal parenthood is 
likely to drive those who want to use surrogacy to ind ways around their par-
ticular problem. People will turn increasingly to the internet to ind surrogates 
in this country via ‘introduction sites’ or social media, resulting in them making 
arrangements that are potentially illicit and almost certainly unwise (see Jackson, 
this volume).31 Beyond that, people seeking ‘easy’ access to surrogates are likely 
to continue to go overseas, to those destinations where it is known surrogacy can 
be bought for a price, via agencies or businesses that facilitate arrangements on 
a commercial basis and where the surrogate herself will be incentivised by the 
prospect of payment. If we are genuinely concerned about the harms that inter-
nationalised surrogacy may bring, such as exploitation of potentially vulnerable 
or underprivileged women who act as surrogates in countries where they have 
little or no protection, or the problems that conlicting laws on legal parenthood 
and nationality have been shown to bring about for the children born from such 
arrangements,32 then perhaps making surrogacy more attractive in the UK is the 
answer. 
Further, it would appear that at least in some instances, there is evidence that 
not only those commissioning surrogates but also some agents acting on their 
behalf in the UK simply do not know enough about the law as it stands.33 To 
have your dreams of parenthood shattered when you have done things right but 
someone else who you seek advice from or you place your trust in has not must 
be incredibly di cult. However, the hardships encountered in such cases would 
arguably be removed if we were to move to a more facilitative regulatory model, 
perhaps containing some aspects found in the Greek and/or Israeli models, but 
which certainly must at least consider the idea that parenthood might presump-
tively rest with the commissioning parents, that payments (perhaps within a regu-
latory framework) be recognised for what they are and that dedicated agencies 
and advisors ought to be able to receive payment for professionalised advice. 
When judges retrospectively authorise payments beyond reasonable expenses on 
a routine basis, because not to do so would contravene the principle that the 
child’s best interests are paramount, and even go so far as to extend the period 
of time in which a Parental Order can be applied for from that outlined in 
statute, this is surely an indication that our laws on surrogacy are deeply lawed, 
31 Note also that ‘partial’ surrogacy arrangements, where the surrogate uses her own egg and is 
inseminated outside of a clinical setting, are totally unregulated by UK law, indicating another 
potential danger of too-restrictive regulation.
32 Notably, France has recently been held to have been in violation of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in its failure to grant citizenship and/or recognition of legal parent-
hood to children born to surrogates in the US: Mennesson v France (application no. 65192/11) and 
Labassee v France (no. 65941/11). French law is set to change accordingly, though the actual practice 
of surrogacy will remain illegal.
33 See e.g. Hedley J’s comments in Re G [2010], at [29] and the recent case JP v LP & Others (Rev 1) 
[2014] EWHC 595 (Fam).
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or not adequate to meet the demands posed by twenty-irst century surrogacy. 
Momentum for change is picking up, with increasing academic criticism mirrored 
by those experiencing surrogacy in day-to-day practice (Gamble, 2014; Ghevaert, 
2014; Prosser, 2013), and with surrogacy taken up as an issue in Parliament in 
October of 2014,34 with indications from the Minister for Public Health (Jane 
Ellison MP) that government will consider January 2015 whether UK surrogacy 
law should be reviewed, after hearing opinions from other MPs. The European 
Parliament has already commissioned its own study on surrogacy laws and prac-
tice across Europe (McCandless et al, 2013), further indicating that surrogacy law 
in this country is ripe for review.35
There will never be universal agreement about surrogacy. Our nearest neigh-
bours on the European continent think it abhorrent and protest about it on the 
streets. But all recent signs indicate that the law regulating surrogacy in the UK 
is not ‘it for purpose’ and that a big opportunity for informed debate leading to 
reform was missed when the 1990 Act was updated. Reform is necessary in order 
to ofer commissioning parents from the UK the safest and fairest route to parent-
hood through surrogacy and it may be that in considering future directions, we 
should consider all options, as well as look to learn from the facilitative legislative 
models of Greece and Israel.
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